15 steps for Turkish-Kurdish peace

Woman carries portrait of jailed Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan in Nowruz gathering in Diyarbakir, Turkey, March 21, 2016. Murat Bay / Press Association. All rights reserved.In
2002 when elected for the first time, Erdogan and his Justice and Development
Party (AKP) made six important pledges. These were: to develop ‘a new pluralistic constitution which respected the
ethnic and religious diversity of the country’; to establish a ‘strong
democracy’; to strengthen the ‘rule of law’; to respect ‘freedom of speech’;
‘to have zero problems with neighbours’ and ‘to find a peaceful resolution with
the Kurds’.

None
of these pledges have been fulfilled. On the contrary: Turkey is in the fifteenth
year of an Erdogan-led government, and all of these six areas are in a worse
state than before. In the 2016
World Press Freedom Index, Turkey is ranking 151. This is lower than Russia,
Pakistan, South Sudan, Zimbabwe, Afghanistan and almost the same level as the
Democratic Republic of Congo. In this article, I want to focus
primarily on the worsening of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. Unless Turkish-Kurdish
relations improve, I contend that it is not possible to resolve the other five
pledges. The Erdogan-led regime has not only put
Turkey into a rogue situation, but the state is now heading towards a civil
war.

A thriving PKK and
Kurdish diplomacy

Turkey, since its establishment as a Republic, has never achieved
sustainable peace. Kurds still cannot freely learn and use their language in
educational, legal, political and even social arenas. The PKK movement and the
conflict between Turks and Kurds is one of the major reasons for this. The
Turkish state has not tried to make peace in any real way, merely reiterated
attempts at military ‘solutions’. These have not brought about any progress in
the last hundred years, and are not moving anything forward now. Different
Turkish governments have mouthed platitudes and postponed any real actions
towards peace. There has never been any substantial move towards building trust
and increasing tolerance between and within different ethnic groups. Successive
Turkish governments did not show any understanding of the real sociological
problems in Turkey.

Previous peace negotiations between Turks and Kurds have
never been balanced. Messages from Ocalan about any negotiations are carried
only by a few selected Kurdish political party members. Although any peace
process must necessarily be limited initially to only a few actors, as we saw
in Northern Ireland and South Africa, there seems to have been no substantive
progress over the last three decades. Many important Kurdish and Turkish
entities, including the diasporas and women organisations, have never been
included in any substantive way.

Kurdish diaspora communities are the result of, and key
actors in, the conflict. They have acted not only as an important driving
engine for homeland politics, but also as a way forward to peace and to the
development of future Kurdish institutions. Some elements in Kurdish diasporas
have recently promoted a strong and even aggressive nationalism. These
contradictions may be an important barrier for Kurdish leaders to overcome if
there is ever going to be peace with Turkey and neighbouring states.

The PKK benefits from the pre-existing problems of the Kurds
and does not find it difficult to recruit new members. Thousands of young
people join the PKK voluntarily every year. This shows that as long as the
current conflict continues, the PKK or similar organisations will not only
exist but will thrive. New groups, such as the TAK or other Young Kurdish
militias within towns and cities, are now more radical than the PKK.

Kurds in Syria and Turkey are slowly but surely
developing their relations with the rest of the world. The French President
Francois Hollande had a meeting with two senior PYD women, Asya Abdullah (the
co-chair of the PYD) and Nesrin Abdullah (the commander of YPG’s female branch)
on 8 February 2014. There are now YPG flags on the doors and walls of the
European Parliament and Kurdish officials now have offices across Europe. Kurds
are welcomed by the Russian government and opened an office in Moscow in the
name of the Rojava administration. USA, French and Russia’s support of Kurds in
Syria (YPG, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units) has increased Turkey’s
aggression against the Kurds. The development of Kurdish autonomy in Syria and
HDP’s success in Turkey have awakened Turkey’s historic fear of the state’s
division and the unification of Kurdish lands with those in neighbouring
countries. For this reason all Turkish political elements (secularist, Islamist
and nationalist) have joined forces against the Kurds.

The authoritarian
regime

Especially Erdogan has used this monopoly of power for his
own use. Erdogan’s eagerness to stay in power has moved Turkey towards an
authoritarian regime in which freedom of expression and rule of law have
already deteriorated. The Erdogan-led regime seems to have a zero respect for
the rule of law if its requests or orders are not supported. Erdogan even spoke
about removing the constitutional court because that court wanted to release
two journalists who were arrested on his orders. He has used the refugee card
as a bargaining chip with the EU to promote his own power.

He has even expanded the meaning of terrorism and suggests
removing citizenship from the so-called ’supporters’ of terrorism, including
journalists or academics who signed the petition for peace between Turks and
Kurds. He has undermined even the implementation of 1980s military made,
monolithic and centralised constitution in many ways. It therefore seems very
unlikely that any Erdogan-led government might develop a constitution which
could move forward many of the issues plaguing Turkey, let alone the
Turkish-Kurdish conflict.

Any critical media has been taken under state control. Even
social media, like Facebook and Twitter, have been switched on and off at
government will. Critical voices, especially pro-Kurdish journalists, have been
arrested. As of April 2016, almost 40 journalists and tens of lawyers are in
prison. Hundreds of academics who, in January 2016, signed a peace petition
against state oppression and operations against the Kurds have faced disciplinary
actions. Many of them have been put in pre-trial detention, and are facing
several years in prison, on the personal orders of Erdogan. Erdogan has been
eliminating all opposition ahead of his bid for an executive or Sultan style of
presidency, and he regards the Kurds as the main barrier to achieving this.

What do the
Kurds really want?

Many Kurds I have interviewed in Diyarbakir, Istanbul,
Berlin and London are angry with both the Erdogan-led AKP goverment’s brutal
response to Kurds and also with the PKK for taking the fight to the towns and
cities and moving away from any peace talks.

The question of what the Kurds want has been asked by many
politicians, international organisations, journalists and academics. First of
all, it is important to acknowledge that Kurds, like many other communties and
nations, do not speak with one voice. Even the PKK has diverse voices,
including Kandil, Ocalan, the Young Kurds, or youth militia and diasporas.
There is also a wide range of other Kurds, including Alevi Kurds, women’s
rights organisations, HDP and youth organisations and conservative religious
Kurds. All these sub groups may well contradict each other. Looking at the
bigger picture, when south Kurdistan (Iraq), East Kurdistan (Iran), Rojava
(Syria) and North Kurdistan (Turkey) are included, the diversity increases. As
one of my interviewees commented: “Kurds do not need any more enemies, they
have themselves. They are a nation with many armies and divisions.“

Many Turkish or western academics, journalists and diplomats
use this heterogeneity and the lack of a single representative as an excuse not
to negotiate with Kurds. They have suggested that Kurds cannot be a nation. But
Turks, Britons and Germans are similarly heterogenous. Just like Turks,
Britons, Germans and all other nations, Kurds have some common issues and
wishes, and representatives who will argue for these. 

15 important steps towards sustainable peace:

This
article has already discussed why the previous peace negotiations have failed. Looking
forward towards possible solutions for a ‘one state solution’, I contend that
there are 15 important steps which must be fulfilled for sustainable peace.

First, the
Turkish state and the PKK should declare a ceasefire for at least one year.
This would create the necessary conditions for peace talks to begin.

Second,
international involvement and guarantees are essential. The European Union and
United States must put pressure on the Turkish government to promote peace and
also to equalise unequal conditions among stakeholders for the peace table.
There is an international historical context, with effects on international
stability and important human rights issues to consider. These all mean that
there is a wide international responsibility to observe, oversee, and to take
an active part in facilitating the peace process.

Third, the
Kurdish leader in Turkey, Abdullah Ocalan should be released from prison. This
is a necessary pre-condition before any real peace process can begin. Only free
and equal people can talk and make peace.

Fourth, any
peace talks should be inclusive and involve all key stakeholders. Not only the
AKP and PKK, but other important Kurdish and Turkish stakeholders, especially
women’s groups, should take part in the peace discussions. With Kurdish
populations living in their historical regions in Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey,
as well as in the diasporas, one cannot separate the Kurdish and Turkish ‘peace
process’ from ongoing conflicts and wars in the neighbouring countries. Many of
the Kurds I interviewed believe that for any successful and permanent peace,
Kurds living in all of these places, including the diasporas, must be involved
in the peace process.

Fifth, the
objectives of the peace process should be clearly defined. Each step should be
accepted, with time frames agreed by all sides.

Sixth,
independent justice, the disarmament of Kurdish fighters, and a reconciliation
process with amnesty for all political prisoners, must be implemented if any
peace process and subsequent coexistence is to be successful in the long term.

Seventh, as
in many other societies with a history of conflict, Turkey needs a new, more
inclusive constitution if it is to move away from the existing problems. The
country is still using the constitution created by the military after the 1980
coup. The new constitution and any amendments affecting its Basic Rights and
Turkey’s ethnic communities cannot be approved without a qualified majority of
two-thirds of votes, within which there must be a majority of votes from the
Kurdish community. This should hopefully protect the constitution from any
majoritarian or authoritarian ruler in the future.

Eighth, the existence and
distinct identity of Turkey’s different ethnic and religious groups such as the
Kurds should be recognised and protected in the new constitution’s basic rights.
The concepts of one religion, one nation, or brotherhood cannot keep Turks,
Kurds and any other groups together if there is no tolerance of differences. Without
tolerance, the idea of one umbrella identity can
only be a temporary solution, and will not resolve the
Turkish-Kurdish problems that have been observed for a century. Pluralistic
society is a fact and one person should not be forced to wear someone else’s
hat. Any peaceful society requires tolerance and respect. As Adorno (1991) and
also Laclau and Mouffe (1985) have emphasised, the appreciation of diversity
means to be diverse without being frightened, and to respect and tolerate the
value of others. 

Ninth, respect for the rule of law and
democratic values, freedom of speech, freedom of the media, the promotion of
gender, ethnic and religious equality at all levels, and decentralisation
should be part of the basic rights included in any new constitution. The new constitution should also include a way for
Kurds and other minority groups to be part of truly democratic politics. This
means that the removal of the current 10 per cent parliamentary threshold is
necessary.

Tenth, devolution
or federalism can contribute to a resolution of almost one hundred years of the
Turkish-Kurdish conflict, since the unitary and centralist system has been a
significant contributor to the conflict. The new constitution should
decentralise power down to elected co-mayors in the towns and cities, rather
than to centrally-appointed governors. Kurds have already successfully
introduced and practice a system of co-mayors and co-chairs that promotes
gender equality. Political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation, with the
creation of local police forces would contribute to a new, peaceful and
pluralistic one-state solution for Turks and Kurds. Education, healthcare,
economic development and sport activities should be decentralised. The
constitution should also permit the use of Kurdish as a working language in
areas where the Kurds form the majority. Such multilingual practices have
already been practised successfully in South Tyrol (Italy), Catalan and Basque
regions (Spain) and Quebec (Canada).

Eleventh, various
consociational power-sharing principles advocated by Arend Lijphart should be
reflected in the new constitution (Lijphart 1977 and 2008). Examples should
include the future formation of coalition governments which represents all major segments of the divided society, including the
Kurds; proportionality in legislative and executive bodies such as the the
Constitutional Court, and within the public administration and allocation of
public funds; minority veto rights on all essential decisions and the existence
of arbitration mechanisms.

Twelfth, a new pluralistic and inclusive state should include full
education in the Kurdish language. Primary through to university level
education should be state funded, as it is in the Republic of Macedonia where
education in the Albanian language is available at all levels (Lyon 2016).
South Tyrol (Italy), Catalan and Basque regions (Spain) and Quebec (Canada) are
just a few other important successful examples.

Thirteenth,
use of community flags and symbols should be allowed in areas where minority
groups form the majority. In the long term it may be necessary to create a new,
inclusive state flag for all as was the case in South Africa.

Fourteenth, economic development in the Kurdish
areas is one of the most important steps for ensuring sustainable peace. The
long-term conflict has created social and economic inequalities, which fuel yet
further conflict. There should be an aim to remove
social and economic inequalities between different parts of Turkey. This might
require, for a limited period of time, positive discrimination in Kurdish
areas.

Fifteenth, the substantial post-conflict ecological and environmental
damage in Kurdish areas should be repaired according to local historical and
cultural values. The replacement of forests and sustainable local water
resources is just as important as the renovation of historical monuments.

Political
and constitutional changes need to be adopted, appreciated and practiced not
only by the state, but across society. All these elements underline how
peace could be managed in conflicted societies.

Especially during the past two decades, many of the nation
states that rejected plurality have faced civil war and, usually, division. The
former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Syria and Sudan are just a few examples. Many more
accommodating countries have accepted, respected and made space for their
ethnic diversity. As discussed in more detail in my book, Legal Pluralism in Action ( see
reference below), with the help of the Millet Practice, the
Ottoman Empire managed to keep together its very diverse society for more than
five centuries. Switzerland has successfully managed its diversity under a
confederal system since 1815. The Scots, Welsh and Northern
Irish have their own devolved administrations in the UK. Germany has sixteen
federal states. Spain is increasingly making space for Catalan and Basque
power. Macedonia has avoided civil war by enshrining in its constitution a
decentralised model of governance (Lyon 2016).

Kurds have already established some de facto political and legal institutions during the ongoing
conflict, as part of their practical resistance against the
Turkish state and institutions of the state. The
current, centralistic, authoritarian state position of Turkey may not be able
to persist for much longer. If the state breaks down any further, Turkey will
be left in as brutal a situation as Yugoslavia, Iraq, Sudan and Syria. And
Europe will have an even larger flood of incoming refugees.

 

References

Adorno,
Theodor (1991) The Culture Industry. Selected Essays on Mass Culture. London:
Routledge.

Laclau, Ernesto and Chantel
Mouffe (2001) Hegemony
and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. Second Edition, London and New York: Verso.

Lijphart, Arend (1977) Democracy
in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. London: Yale University
Press.

Lijphart, Arend (2008) Thinking
About Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice. Abingdon:
Routledge.

Lyon, Aisling (2016) Decentralisation
and the Management of Ethnic Conflict: Lessons from the Rebublic of Macedonia.
Abingdon: Routledge.

Tas, Latif (2014) Legal
Pluralism in Action: Dispute Resolution and Kurdish Peace Committee.
Farnham: Ashgate.

Tastekin, Fehim (2016) Syrian Kurds expand diplomatic in
Europe. Al-Monitor [Online, 22 April
2016]. Available at:
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/04/turkey-syria-rojava-kurds-expand-diplomatic-network-europe.html#
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