Scenes of ‘civil war’? Radical right narratives on Chemnitz

21 September 2018, Saxony, Chemnitz: Right-wing populist movement 'Pro Chemnitz' marching through the city. Press Association images. All rights reserved.

In late August, the east
German city of Chemnitz startled observers from all over the world. On 26
August 2018, 35 yr.old German Daniel H. was stabbed to death after a quarrel had escalated at a city
festival in Chemnitz (Saxony). Shortly afterwards, the police arrested two
asylum seekers from Syria and Iraq as the presumed perpetrators of this crime. 

Tremendous
repercussions ensued.

Although the victim
was neither a member of the radical right scene nor known as a sympathizer to
any radical right organisation, neo-Nazis and hooligans misappropriated the
crime to instigate violent mass demonstrations and riots in the following days
and weeks. They were joined by the radical right party Alternative für
Deutschland (AfD). The events brought to the surface what the radical right in
Germany is capable of, once operating jointly, while police forces were visibly
overchallenged. The events brought to the surface what the radical right in
Germany is capable of, once operating jointly.

Furthermore, the radical
right mobilization of Chemnitz affected the ruling coalition of the SPD and
CDU/CSU in Berlin. The appraisal of the events caused a governmental crisis
among this already beleaguered coalition. It eventually led to the removal of
the domestic intelligence chief, Hans-Georg Maaßen from his post, after he incorrectly labelled
the coverage of the racist assaults, “fake news”.

For well-versed
observers, the radical right marches of Chemnitz did not come as a surprise. Saxony has been the site of numerous far-right mobilizations over recent years.
To understand the dynamics of these events, it is important to analyse the
radical right narratives that came into effect in Chemnitz. Furthermore, it is
crucial to embed these neo-Nazi actions into their historical context.

Taking the historical context of racist
mobilizations in Germany into account

Journalists and eye
witnesses have documented how participants in the neo-Nazi demonstrations hunted down and assaulted immigrants and
left-wing activists, attacked a Jewish restaurant and publicly called for murder. The
instrumentalization of a real or a supposed capital crime, committed by a ‘foreigner’
is a popular resource within the radical right scene as it works well to
inflame racist sentiments and fuel fears. As the Chemnitz case shows, the
concerns of the victims or their relatives meanwhile do not matter.

Racist rioting has an
almost 30-year history in Germany: In August 1992, rioters attacked an asylum
hostel in Rostock-Lichtenhagen (Mecklenburg Hither-Pomerania), while several
thousand bystanders applauded them. As in these assaults, neo-Nazis and local
residents attacked refugee hostels in Hoyerswerda (Saxony) in 1991 and Mannheim-Schönau (Baden-Wuerttemberg) in 1992. More than twenty
years later, in August 2015, hundreds of violent rioters besieged a recently-opened
refugee hostel in Heidenau (Saxony). These sieges also lasted for several
days or night in a row, with the police only hesitantly putting an end to them.
These sieges also lasted for several days or night
in a row, with the police only hesitantly putting an end to them.

Given the fact that
similar mass violence has occurred in the past, the radical right movement can
be characterised by cyclical recurring mobilizations, David Begrich says, who is an expert on the radical right in
Eastern Germany. He and other scholars stress the relevance of the “Generation Hoyerswerda” generation of neo-Nazis who experienced the early 1990s’ racist riots
as an expression of significant political potency. That narrative not only had
its impact on activists who were politicised 25 years ago, but it underwent a
mutation that also allowed it to appeal to later generations.

Chemnitz as the outcome of longterm developments
in Saxony

Alarmingly, more than
6.000 far-right protesters marched through the city of Chemnitz only one day
after the murder incident. The radical right’s capability to react so quickly
has astonished many observers. Credit for this can be laid at the door of
social media and advanced communication technologies. But it was also the further
consequence of a certain ”permanent propaganda from the far right” Saxony has
been seeing for years, as sociologist and head of the Institute for Democracy and Civil Society (IDZ) in Jena,
Matthias Quent put it. Saxony is the homeland of the radical
right Pegida
demonstrations
that have frequently been able to convene thousands of participants since 2014.
Additionally, between 2000 and 2010, the capital city of Saxony, Dresden, was
the site of one of the largest far-right demonstrations in Germany with up to
7,000 participants remembering the bombing of Dresden by the Allies on February
13, 1945.

Since 2013, the
radical right in Eastern Germany has significantly extended its regional and
political range. In addition, the rise of the AfD has made far-right positions
widely socially acceptable. The rise of the AfD has
made far-right positions widely socially acceptable.

Saxony is a region in eastern Germany that combines a
well-connected and experienced neo-Nazi scene on the one hand and a high
approval rate for radical right parties on the other hand. At the federal
elections in September 2017, the AfD reached 27 percent of all votes in Saxony and became the
strongest party, even ahead of the Conservative Party.

The radical right narrative of a ‘people’s
uprising’ in eastern Germany

For the different factions of the radical right scene, the violent
demonstrations in Chemnitz were a cause for rejoicing. Their comments and
statements told us much about current far-right self-conceptions. Many activists
consider themselves to be in a civil war fuelled by “(Muslim) foreigners” and
approved by the government as the far-right blog “journalistenwatch” put it. But
also the notion of a ‘revolution’ was widespread, even including positive
invocations of the Nazi period. For example, an AfD county council faction in
Hesse wrote on its Facebook page: “During revolutions known to us the
broadcasting studios and the publishing houses were stormed at some point and
the employees were dragged into the streets. This is what media representatives
should once reflect here in this country since when the mood is changing
eventually it is too late.” This post related to the violent suppression of the
free press in 1933 after the National Socialists had taken over power. This post related to the violent suppression of the free
press in 1933 after the National Socialists had taken over power.

The imagination of a ‘people’s uprising’ can also be traced to the popular
narrative that eastern Germans had won out over the GDR government in 1989 and
that the people in eastern Germany are in a similar situation today. In eastern
Germany, the radical right milieu shares the collective storyline of overthrowing
a political system – a regime change that can be
repeated again, as Begrich says. A chorusing of “Wir sind das Volk” (“We
are the people”), adopted from the 1989 Monday demonstrations, is frequently heard
on Pegida and other radical
right demonstrations for example. These narratives can be revived whenever the occasion
seems convenient.

The Chemnitz case serves
as an example of a Saxon city where the radical right has tried to establish itself
and to maintain hegemony for years. With the demonstrations in late August and
early September, the scene that opened up was not only well organised and
spontaneous at the same time, but it has also brought to light the fact that
many far-right activists and sympathizers have some very concrete fantasies about
a violent ‘overthrow’.